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MENTAL ILLNESS
If one cannot accept the theses of Bandura and Walters,
Szasz, Glasser, and others regarding mental illness, the prac-
tical necessity for society in its self-governance to abjure con-
ventional psychiatry-and with it its inroads upon tests of
criminal responsibility based upon rational existence-must
be recognized. One jurist has done so with clarity. Judge
Weintraub of the Supreme Court of New Jersey has written:
"Man may one day obtain a better glimpse of himself, but
until a basis for personal blameworthiness can be scientifically
demonstrated, I would not tinker with the existing law of
criminal accountability."54
M. David Riggs
14 State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 152 A.2d 50 (1959).
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY - A PROPOSAL
FOR RULES IN OKLAHOMA
"The genius and character of our laws and usages arefriendly, not to condemnation at all events, but to a fair
and impartial trial; and they consequently allow to the
accused the right of preparing the means to secure such
a trial."1 Mr. Chief Justice Marshall.
A fair and impartial trial to Mr. Chief Justice Marshall
was one in which the prosecution and defense were placed by
the law on equal ground.2 It would seem, therefore, that the
best way to insure an impartial criminal trial is through full
use of discovery procedures such as are available in civil
actions.
The purposes of this article are (1) to discuss the founda-
tion of criminal discovery in the United States; (2) to acquaint
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 32-33 ( No. 14,692d)
(C. C. D. Va. 1807) (sitting as Circuit Justice).
2 Id, at 33.
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the reader with Oklahoma's new, limited criminal discovery
statute;3 (3) to demonstrate the need for the court to supple-
ment this statute by rule; and (4) to suggest rules needed to
effect more complete discovery.
Discovery furnishes a means of forcing full disclosure of
the facts of a case where counsel refuses voluntarily to dis-
close them.4 Before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
civil suit was a game of wits; too often the outcome was
dependent upon a lawyer's ability to conceal the true facts
and sway the jury by persuasive oratory.
In civil actions, discovery serves three distinct purposes:
(1) To obtain evidence for use at trial.
(2) To secure information concerning the existence of evi-
dence that may be used at trial and to ascertain how and from
whom it may be procured.
(3) To narrow the issues, so that evidence at the trial need
only concern matters which are actually disputed and con-
troverted.6
It has been recognized that when both parties use civil
discovery procedures, there is less likelihood of trial. When
there is a trial, there is a narrowing of issues, and the result
is more likely to be just.7
The arguments that support rules of civil discovery to
expidite the administration of justice in civil litigation are just
3 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 340 (Supp. 1967).
4 See Chandler, Discovery and Pretrial Procedure in Federal
Courts, 12 OKIA. L. REV. 321 (1959).5 Id. at 322.
6 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947), citing Pike, The
New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure and the Rules
of Evidence, 34 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1939); Pike & Willis, The New
Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure pts. 1-2, 38 CoLUM.
L. REV. 1179, 1436 (1938).
7 Chandler, supra note 4, at 325.
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CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
as valid support for the formulation of rules for criminal dis-
covery. The Constitution is equally as concerned with life
and liberty as it is with property. If the accused is innocent,
we should be concerned that he suffers no more anxiety of
mind and derangement of affairs than is necessary. If he is
guilty, society demands that the accused be brought to punish-
ment quickly.
I
Rex v. Holland8 is commonly cited as authority for the
proposition that discovery in criminal cases was not available
at common law. In that case an information based on the
report of a board of inquiry was filed against an officer of the
East India Company. The court held that the defendant had
no right to inspect the report and stated that it lacked the dis-
cretionary power to grant such a request. Lord Kenyon stated
that to hold otherwise would be to "subvert the whole system
of criminal law".9 Justice Buller was of the opinion that the
court was bound to proceed according to the act of Parliament:
if that act gave the defendant the right he claimed, it re-
moved the court's discretion; if it gave no right, the court
could not assume such a discretionary power.10
Although the American courts have adopted the English
common law system, their source of power is not derived from
any parliamentary body, but is established by constitutional
grants." Therefore, our courts should have discretionary
power to formulate rules of procedure to implement the judic-
ial process.12
In United States v. Burr,3 Mr. Chief Justice Marshall dis-
8 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K. B. 1792).
9 Id. at 1249.
10 Id.
"I See U.S. CONST. art. III; OKLA. CONST. art. VII.
12 See State v. Roy, 40 N. M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936); Goodwin v.
Bickford, 20 Okla. 91, 93 P. 548 (1908).
13 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,962d) (C. C. D. Va. 1807).
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cussed the constitutional mandate to the court to aid the ac-
cused in obtaining a fair and speedy trial. The proceedings
were commenced by bringing the prisoner before Marshall as
a committing magistrate for preliminary examination. The
charges were: (1) setting on foot and providing the means
for an expedition against territories of a nation at peace with
the United States, and (2) committing high treason against
the United States. The defendant, Burr, sought a subpoena
duces tecum directing the President to obtain copies of orders
and letters which Burr claimed might be material to his
defense. The prosecution argued that until the grand jury,
then meeting to consider Burr's activities returned a true
bill, the accused was not entitled to subpoenas nor the aid
of the court to obtain testimony. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall
stated:
So far back as any knowledge of our jurisprudence is
possessed, the uniform practice of this country has been,
to permit any individual, who was charged with any
crime, to prepare for his defense, and to obtain the pro-
cess of the court, for enabling him so to do. This practice
is as convenient and as consonant to justice as it is to
humanity. It prevents, in a great measure, those delays
which are never desirable, which frequently occasion
the loss of testimony, and which often are oppres-
sive....
The [sixth] amendment to the Constitution 14 gives
the accused, "in all criminal prosecutions, a right to a
speedy and public trial, and to compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor." The right given by
this article must be deemed sacred by the courts, and
14 U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence." (Authors' footnote.)
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
the article should be so construed as to be some-
thing more than a dead letter. What can more ef-
fectually elude the right to a speedy trial than the
declaration that the accused shall be disabled from
preparing for it until an indictment shall be found
against him? It is certainly much more in the true spirit
of the provision which secures to the accused a speedy
trial, that he should have the benefit of the provision
which entitles him to compulsory process as soon as he
is brought into court.15
The prosecution argued that allowing the accused the
court's process to obtain evidence for his defense might lend
itself to abuse. However, the Chief Justice emphasized:
[A] motion to the court's discretion is a motion, not to
its inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is
to be guided by sound legal principles .... The court
[should] not lend its aid to motions obviously designed
to manifest disrespect to the government; but the court
has no right to refuse its aid to motions for papers to
which the accused may be entitled, and which may be
material to his defence....
It is a principle, universally acknowledged, that a
party has a right to oppose to the testimony of any wit-
ness against him, the declarations which that witness
has made at other times on the same subject. If he pos-
sesses this right, he must bring forward proof of those
declarations. This proof must be obtained before he
knows positively what the witness will say; for if he
waits until the witness has been heard at the trial, it is
too late to meet him with his former declarations. These
former declarations, therefore, constitute a mass of testi-
mony, which a party has a right to obtain by way of pre-
caution, and the positive necessity of which can only be
decided at the trial.16
These statements not only constitute a foundation for
criminal discovery, but also indicate it is an essential ele-
ment within the constitutional scheme of a fair trial.
15 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 32-33 (No. 14,692d)
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (emphasis added).
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Why then did United States v. Burr pass into obscurity?
One reason is that most criminal cases are tried in state
courts. The Supreme Court in Barron v. Baltimore17 held that
the Bill of Rights enunciated in the United States Constitu-
tion provided limitations on the encroachment of individual
liberties by the federal government and was not applicable
to state or local governments. On the basis of the holding
in the Barron case, the Supreme Court of Florida character-
ized Marshall's opinion in Burr as not in point and unavail-
able to a defendant in a state criminal trial.1 8
Thus, with the exception of the restrictions in the orig-
inal Constitution, the states were left free to define,
protect, limit, or abolish political and civil rights as they
saw fit without interference from the federal courts.10
Another reason appears to be that Marshall was looked upon
with suspicion by his fellow jurists because of his alleged
habit of making law.20 This suspicion caused many judges to
limit the application of their holdings, to narrow issues, and
to ignore the broad principles of law laid down by Marshall.
The Burr decision met this fate in Worthington v. Scribner,21
where the court held that Marshall had merely held that a
subpoena duces tecum might issue to the President of the
United States. The court then stated the principle which has
been adopted as the rule in all jurisdictions:
It is the duty of every citizen to communicate to his
government any information which he has of the com-
mission of an offense against its laws. To encourage
16 Id. at 35-36.
11 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
18 Pittman v. State, 51 Fla. 94, 41 So. 385, 389 (1906).
19 R. TREsomL, Au iCAc CONsTITuToNAL LAW 349 (1959).
20 See United States v. Kendall, 26 F. Cas. 702, 709 (No. 15,517)
(C.C.D.C. 1837), where the court noted: "[T]he practice of
Justice Marshall, of traveling out of his case, to prescribe
what the law would be in a moot case, not before the Court,
is very irregular and censurable."
21 109 Mass. 487 (1872).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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him in performing this duty without fear of conse-
quences, the law holds such information to be among
the secrets of state, and leaves the question of how far
and under what circumstances the names of the in-
formers and the channels of communication shall be
suffered to be known, to the absolute discretion of the
government, to be exercised according to its views of
what the interests of the public require. Courts of justice
therefore will not compel or allow the discovery of such
information [by any person] without the permission of
the government. The evidence is excluded, not for the
protection of the witness or of the party in the particular
case, but upon general grounds of public policy, because
of the confidential nature of such communications.
22
Today, after over one hundred years, Burr has again
emerged, set free by the Supreme Court in preserving the
individual liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. The prin-
ciple of the Worthington case was eroded by the Supreme
Court in Roviaro v. United States,2 where the refusal of the
government to divulge the identity of an informer in a nar-
cotics prosecution was in issue. The Court held that where
disclosure of the identity of an informer or the contents of
his communication is relevant and helpful to the defense of
the accused or essential to a fair determination of a cause,
the sovereign's privilege to withhold that information must
give way.24 Mr. Justice Burton stated:
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure
is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balanc-
ing the public interest in protecting the flow of infor-
mation against the individual's right to prepare his
defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclo-
sure erroneous must depend on the particular circum-
stances of each case, taking into consideration the crime
charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance
of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors.25
22 Id. at 488-89; se.e In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1894); Vogel v.
Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884).
2 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
24 Id. at 60-61.
2 5 Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court has broadened the right of the ac-
cused to obtain a fair and impartial trial by its holding in
Escobedo v. Illinois.26 Condemning the grilling of the accused
without permitting him to consult with his attorney, the Court
said: "[T]he 'right to use counsel at the formal trial [would
be] a very hollow thing [if], for all practical purposes, the con-
viction is already assured by pretrial examination'."27 The
Court rejected the state's argument that such a practice would
take away the effectiveness of the prosecution in obtaining
convictions. It admonished the state: "If the exercise of con-
stitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of
law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with
that system. '28 The court concluded that when the process.
shifts from investigatory to accusatory, the sixth amend-
ment's right to counsel begins to operate.2 9
In Pointer v. Texas30 the constitutional guarantee of the
right of the accused to be confronted by the witnesses against
him was held to be obligatory upon the states through the
fourteenth amendment and that this right might arise at the
preliminary hearing. If the sixth amendment's guarantee of
counsel begins at the accusatory stage, should not its further
guarantees of the right to process and to confrontation begin
at least as soon as one is charged and committed? Discovery is
but the means of obtaining the testimony of one's accuser so
that he may have time to gather evidence to refute that testi-
mony at trial. If the accused must wait until trial to know the
nature of the state's evidence, his rights are weakened by
placing the prosecution in a position to surprise the defense
with testimony he is unprepared to meet. Where life and
liberty are at stake there is no place for the element of sur-
26 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
27 1d. at 487, quoting In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 344 (1957) (dis-
senting opinion).28Id. at 490.
29 1d. at 492.
30 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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prise. Such a practice tips the scales of justice against the
individual.
In 1967 the Oklahoma Legislature amended the criminal
procedure code to provide that, upon request, a transcript of
the testimony of witnesses appearing before a grand jury shall
be made available to the accused, and in the event that he is
an indigent, it shall be provided at the expense of the state.3 '
The legislature may have been concerned about the rising
number of grand jury investigations, the conduct, and the
competency of evidence received. Under the new law, even
though the defendant has no right to appear and be heard be-
fore the grand jury,82 he may determine, from the record, the
nature of the evidence and be able to gather additional evi-
dence for refutation.
Questions may be raised as to whether this new law in-
vades the secrecy of the grand jury. The rule of secrecy was
was not, however, designed for the protection of witnesses,
but rather, for the protection of the grand jurors in the fur-
therance of public justice.33 The legislature now has deter-
mined that furnishing a copy of the testimony of witnesses
before the grand jury is in the public interest. This law in
no way requires disclosure of how individual grand jurors
voted or expressed themselves on any matter3 4
III
The Oklahoma constitution authorizes prosecution of fel-
onies by information or by indictment.35 Prosecution by in-
81 OILA. STAT. tit. 22, § 340 (Supp. 1967). Prior to the amend-
ment no transcript was allowed. Law of Feb. 21, 1961, ch. 4c,
§ 1, [1961] Okla. Sess. Laws 236 (amended 1967).
32 People v. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328, 19 P. 161 (1888), as an
example from another jurisdiction.
33 People v. Young, 31 Cal. 563 (1867).34 See OKLA. STAT. tit 22, § 341 (1961).
3r OKLA. CONST. art II, § 17.
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formation does not violate due process.36 "It may be questioned
whether the proceeding by indictment secures to the accused
any superior rights and privileges; but certainly a prosecution
by information takes from him no immunity or protection he
is entitled under law. '3 7 This rationale may have been true in
1909; however, a serious question of due process arises with
the enactment of the recent amendment. Even if criminal dis-
covery is not constitutionally guaranteed, the legislature has
given the accused a limited right to discovery in prosecutions
by indictment. The defendant has no right to take depositions
from the witnesses who appeared before the grand jury, but
the receipt of their testimony is an invaluable aid in prepar-
ing his defense. If the state elects to prosecute by informa-
tion, however, the defendant has no discovery rights. In some
Oklahoma counties, few grand juries have ever been con-
vened.38 If the legislature did not intend to give the accused
a hollow right, due process would seem to demand that he be
given a similar right to discovery with respect to prosecution
by information. 39.
It has been suggested that the Oklahoma appellate courts,
in supervising the administration of the inferior courts, have
much more rule-making power than they have exercised to
date.40 Oklahoma courts have inherent power at least to make
36 In re McNaught, 1 Okla. Crim. 528, 99 P.2d 241 (1909), fol-
lowing liurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).37 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 520 (1884), approving
language of Mr. Justice Fr.eelon in Kalloch v. Superior
Court, 56 Cal. 229, 241 (1880); see In re McNaught, 1 Okla.
Crim. 528, 538, 99 P.2d 241, 245 (1909).
38 See Pierro v. Turner, 95 Okla. Crim. 425, 247 P.2d 291 (1952).
39 Accomplished in California by Statute, CAL. PFNAL CODE §§
869, 943 (West 1956) ; § 938.1 (West Supp. 1967). Statutes pro-
vide a defendant the right to a transcript of grand jury testi-
mony if he is prosecuted by indictment or a transcript of
testimony at his preliminary hearing if he is prosecuted by
information.4 0 Comment, Rule Making-The Judicial Regulation of Pro-
cedure, 4 OKI.A. L. BEv. 259 (1951).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 5 [1968], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol5/iss2/6
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
rules of practice which do not contravene any statute or law
of the land.41 In recent months the Oklahoma Supreme Court
has expressed a desire to improve and expedite the adminis-
tration of justice.42 That court has adopted, rules of civil dis-
covery patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.40 3
If the Oklahoma Supreme Court has the power to make civil
rules to expedite justice, surely the Oklahoma Court of Crim-
inal Appeals should have the power to formulate standard
rules of criminal discovery.44
IV
The following set of rules are presented for consideration
in the hope that they might aid in providing a working pro-
cedure to insure that all relevant facts are exposed and that
the rights of the accused remain inviolate. The underlying
premise is Marshall's command that the law should place the
prosecution and defense on equal ground.45 Cases and statutes
from states which lead in the formulation of criminal discovery
procedures will be cited to support these rules and to show that
a system of complete discovery is practical.
1. Once brought before a magistrate, an accused shall be
entitled to a true and correct copy of any and all statements
or confessions he has given to the police. In Powell v. Superior
Court 6 the trial court denied defendant's motion for an order
authorizing petitioner and his attorney a pretrial inspection
of his signed confession and a transcript of statements made
-1 Goodwin v. Bickford, 20 Okla. 91, 93 P. 548 (1908).
42 38 OKLA. B. A. J. 1952 (1967).
43 OKLA. STAT. tit 12, ch. 2 Appendix, R. 5, 12, 14, 15 (Supp.
1967).
44 See Inverarity v. Zumwalt, 97 Okla. Crim. 294, 298, 262 P.2d
725, 730 (1953). "[The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
has] supervisory power over all criminal actions in every
court from which any appeal may be perfected to [it],
directly or through an intermediate court, as where a case
has been 'commenced' by filing of a preliminary information
and issuance of warrant."
"See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
46 48 Cal 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957).
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to the police. Basing its decision on the defendant's allegation
that he needed the information to refresh his recollection and
on respondent's admission that the material was relevant to
the issues of the case, the Supreme Court of California allowed
inspection. It held that an application for pretrial inspection of
a signed confession, admission, or transcripts of statements
is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court
and should be allowed where it is in the interest of justice.
2. At the time he is brought before a magistrate, the
accused or his attornzey shall be given a copy of all reports
upon which the charge is brought. In People v. Riser 7 the
California Supreme Court stated that, in the absence of some
governmental requirement that information be kept confi-
dential, a defendant is entitled to have discovery during trial
of statements that witnesses have given to police. The court
reasoned that discovery should be allowed for purposes of im-
peachment since one goal of a criminal trial is the ascer-
tainment of facts. Using the Riser case as a steppingstone, the
same court in Funk v. Superior Court48 allowed discovery of
witnesses' statements made at the pretrial stage. It said that
there is no sound reason for applying a different rule merely
because production is requested prior to, rather than during,
trial. The Supreme Court of Missouri in State v. Tippett"
earlier had given defendant the right to obtain statements
in the hands of police in order to impeach the testimony of
a witness.
... That it was desired that the state's evidence remain
undisclosed, partakes in the nature of a game, rather
than judicial procedure. The state in its might and
power ought to be and is too jealous of according a de-
fendant a fair and impartial trial to hinder him in in-
telligently preparing his defense and in availing him-
self of all competent material and relevant evidence
that tends to throw light on the subject-matter on trial.60
47 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956).
48 52 Cal 2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959).
49 317 Mo. 319, 296 S.W. 132 (1927).
60 296 S.W. at 135.
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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3. Once committed, the accused shall be entitled to take
depositions of all witnesses whom the prosecution intends to
call in support of its case at trial. In 1961 the Vermont Legis-
lature passed a statute which gives the accused, after the filing
of the indictment or information, the right to take the deposi-
tion of any witness whose testimony would be material to
his defense.51 In a recent article on criminal discovery in Ver-
mont it is pointed out that the effect of this statute has been
to decrease the likelihood of a trial because the defendant can
readily determine the nature of the state's case. The element
of bluffing is eliminated, and the parties are encouraged to
work out a solution to the charge.52
4. In order to be sure that all relevant facts are brought
forth, the accused shall be required to give to the prosecu-
tion the names and addresses of all witnesses whom he in-
tends to call in his defense.
5. The prosecution shall have the right to take the deposi-
tions of the disclosed defense witnesses before trial.
6. The prosecution shall have the right to direct interro-
gatories to the accused to require him to answer questions on
all the matters that he intends to present at trial.
7. The accused shall not be required to answer any ques-
* tion relating to a matter that he does not intend to present at
trial or which would tend to incriminate him.
The Supreme Court of California in Jones v. Superior
Court 3 allowed the prosecution pretrial discovery of the names
of physicians, medical reports and X-rays which were in-
tended for use at trial to prove the defendant impotent and
incapable of rape. The court stated that this rule did not vio-
late the privilege against self-incrimination because it only
51 VT. STAT. ANN. tit 13, § 6721 (Supp. 1965).
52 Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53
A.B.A.J. 732 (1967).
53 58 Cal 2d 56, 372 P. 2d 919, 22 Cal. Reptr. 879 (1962).
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required the defendant to disclose information he would
shortly reveal in any event. Absent the privilege against self-
incrimination or any other privilege provided by law, the de-
fendant in a criminal case has no valid interest in denying
the prosecution access to evidence which can throw light on
the issues of the case.
8. A failure of the accused to take advantage of the op-
portunities which these rules would present shall constitute a
waiver of his right to a new trial on the basis of newly dis-
covered evidence if such evidence reasonably could have been
obtained through these procedures. The supreme courts of both
Vermont and California have held that where a defendant
does not use a reasonable effort, including discovery, to pro-
duce all his evidence at trial he is not entitled to a new trial
on the basis of newly discovered evidence which would have
been made known to him had he used the method available."4
The parade of "horribles" escaping from Pandora's box
as proposed by the opponents of change ... are numer-
ous. They include possible intimidation of witnesses, bet-
ter opportunity to prepare perjured testimony, harass-
ment of prosecutors and police officers, extra burden on
the prosecution officer, increased costs of the adminis-
tration of criminal law, etc.
The interesting thing shown by Vermont's experience is
that all of these "horribles" are imaginary. 5 After five years
of practice under the system neither prosecutors, judges nor
defense counsel were calling for a return to the old law.
"Let us not cut ourselves off from the good because of a few
islands of potential danger. If there is real danger, it can
be controlled."5 6
Robert E. Funk, Jr.
Ralph B. Pinskey
54 People v. Williams, 57 Cal. 2d 263, 368 P. 2d 353, 18 Cal. Reptr.
729 (1962); State v. Ciocca, 225 A.2d 65, (Vt. 1967).
5 Langrock, supra note 53, at 734.56 Id.
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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